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OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 Exxon Shipping Company appeals from a district court 
order which declined to vacate and instead confirmed and enforced 
an arbitration award reinstating an Exxon employee who had been 
discharged for refusing to submit to a drug test.  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
 The collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") 
between Exxon Shipping Company and Exxon Seamen's Union expired 
on August 31, 1987.  After eight months of negotiating for a 
successor agreement, Exxon, in a letter sent on March 29, 1988 to 
all oceangoing employees, declared an impasse and advised the 
Union and its members that Exxon's final proposals would be 
implemented on April 1, 1988. 
 The March 29 letter stated that the terms of the new 
working relationship between Exxon and the Union would include, 
inter alia, the company's Drug and Alcohol Policy and any 
provisions of the expired Agreement that were not part of the 
negotiations.  That "Policy Statement on Employee Alcohol and 
 Drug Use," issued with the March 29 letter, contained the 
following language: 
Exxon Shipping Company may from time to time conduct 
unannounced searches for drugs and alcohol on owned or 
controlled property.  The Company also has the right to 
require employees to submit to medical evaluation or 
alcohol and drug testing where cause exists to suspect 
alcohol or drug misuse.  A positive test result or 
refusal to submit to a drug test is grounds for 
disciplinary action, including dismissal.  
 
App. at 44 (emphasis added). 
 Exxon amplified its Drug and Alcohol Policy in a letter 
sent to all oceangoing employees on September 27, 1988. Exxon 
explained it would be aggressively enforcing its Alcohol and Drug 
Policy and gave "official notice" that violation of the policy 
"will result in immediate termination from the vessel." App. at 
49-50 (emphasis in original). 
 One of the terms of the Agreement remaining in effect 
during the negotiations was a "Discipline" section, which stated 
that "there will be posted . . . a list of rules which shall 
constitute cause for which unlicensed personnel may be discharged 
without further notice."  App. at 147 (emphasis added).  Included 
on this list was "[i]nsubordination, including failure or refusal 
to perform work assigned."  App. at 128a.  A provision of the 
Agreement providing for grievance and arbitration of disputes 
also remained in effect. 
 The case before us stems from Exxon's discharge of Alan 
B. Cash, a thirteen-year employee who started with Exxon as a 
seaman and advanced to chief pumpman.  The duties of a pumpman 
include loading and unloading cargo and properly aligning pumps 
 for the transfer of products.  The parties do not dispute that it 
is a safety-sensitive position and is subject to Coast Guard 
regulations pertaining to drug testing. 
 On or about May 10, 1989, Cash was transferred from the 
Exxon Benecia in Japan to the Exxon Washington, anchored in San 
Francisco Bay.  For the period of May 10-15, Cash resided in the 
second pumpman's room of the Exxon Washington.  On May 15, the 
chief pumpman of the Exxon Washington vacated the ship and Cash 
moved into his room.  On May 17, Exxon conducted an unannounced 
drug search of all the rooms of the Exxon Washington.  Marijuana 
was discovered in various places in the chief pumpman's room 
which Cash had been occupying for the last day and a half.  
 As a result of the search, Exxon requested that Cash 
take a drug test.  He refused.  By letter dated June 6, 1989, 
Exxon discharged Cash, stating that he had violated Exxon's Drug 
and Alcohol Policy by refusing to submit to a drug test after 
reasonable cause for testing had been determined.  The Union 
filed a grievance to protest Cash's discharge, and the dispute 
was eventually submitted to arbitration before an arbitration 
panel of three members, one appointed by Exxon, one by the Union, 
and the third a neutral arbitrator who acted as Chairman. 
 In an Opinion and Award dated November 27, 1992, the 
Chairman made the following factual findings:  A "very small" 
amount of marijuana or marijuana residue was found in the cabin 
used by Cash as of May 17, 1989.  This small amount was found in 
a number of places:  green leafy material in a desk and cabinet; 
ash on the rug near the bed; seeds under the rug; and cigarette 
 ends, or "roaches," in a pouch of a suitcase.  App. at 91-92.  No 
traces of drugs were found in the quarters Cash previously 
occupied.  Cash was in the room in which marijuana was discovered 
for only one and a half days and for only a few hours daily 
during that period.  A chief pumpman and another pumpman used the 
cabin before Cash moved into it, and other persons had access to 
the room because the door was left unlocked.  Cash did not ask 
the utility men to clean his cabin because he did not want to 
interfere with their shore leave.   
 Despite the marijuana found in Cash's suitcase, the 
Chairman found "it is not reasonable to attribute, by clear and 
convincing evidence, ownership of the drug materials in the cabin 
to Mr. Cash." App. at 92.  The Chairman noted that there were no 
drugs found in Cash's previous room and that it was unlikely that 
in his short time in the room he would have caused marijuana 
seeds to be under the carpet. Id.  He also stated that "the cabin 
had not been cleaned at the time of the search, had been used by 
a number of persons in previous days, and was open to others." 
Id.  The Chairman concluded that "[t]he circumstantial evidence 
certainly does not point to only the one logical conclusion that 
the material belonged to grievant," and therefore there was no 
"reasonable cause" under Coast Guard regulations to demand a drug 
test.  App. at 92-93.  
 The Chairman next considered whether there was cause to 
test Cash under the company policy.  He remarked that "[t]he 
matter of the suitcase is the weakest point of Mr. Cash's defense 
against the charge that he violated company policy by introducing 
 marijuana into his cabin."  App. at 93.  Cash had stated at one 
point that his wife had purchased the suitcase for him but 
testified at the arbitration that he had acquired the suitcase on 
a previous ship.  The Chairman noted, however, that no doubt had 
been raised that the suitcase was used before Cash obtained it, 
and "[t]he undiscovered cigarette ends could have been in the 
pouch no matter how the bag was obtained."  Id.  He added that 
"[n]o inference can be drawn from the presence of the other 
marijuana in the searched room that grievant put the `roaches' in 
the bag."  Id. 
 Finding the circumstantial evidence insufficient to 
prove that Cash possessed marijuana, the Chairman determined Cash 
could not be discharged for possession under a "just cause" 
standard.  App. at 94.  He concluded with the following passage: 
 We must come to an ex post conclusion about 
whether there was cause to order a drug test.  On May 
17, 1989, in light of what Mr. Newman and his cohorts 
found, "cause" did exist. . . . The instant review of 
the findings concludes, however, that even though drug 
material was discovered in grievant's cabin, sufficient 
question was raised about ownership of the drugs so 
that "cause" "reasonable cause", "probable cause" or 
"just cause" did not exist to order a test.  And Mr. 
Shearer's testimony established that Mr. Cash's 
appearance and actions provided no basis for ordering a 
test. 
 The chairman concludes that if Mr. Cash had taken 
the demanded drug test and then had grieved, a later 
arbitration would have found that lack of "cause" 
"reasonable cause" "probable cause" or "just cause" to 
have ordered a test on the basis of what was found in 
the cabin would have led to reversal of any discipline 
based on test results.  This analysis of the findings 
of the search shows that a test could not have been 
ordered on the basis of what was discovered in the 
cabin. 
Id. 
  The Chairman did find, however, that Cash was 
insubordinate in refusing to take the test, saying he "violated 
the fundamental rule that . . . employees must first obey an 
order and then grieve."  App. at 95.  Nevertheless, "since the 
order to take the drug test arose out of an incorrect evaluation 
of the meaning of the marijuana found in Mr. Cash's cabin, 
discharge for failure to accept the test is not possible."  Id.  
The Chairman ordered reinstatement with full seniority but 
without back pay. 
 The opinion was that of the Chairman of the Arbitration 
Panel.  The Panel's award was issued by the neutral chairman and 
the Union appointed arbitrator who concurred with the award.  The 
Company appointed arbitrator dissented. 
 Exxon filed suit in district court pursuant to section 
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to 
vacate the arbitration award on the following two grounds:  1) 
that enforcement of the award would violate public policy; and 2) 
that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority by reinstating 
Cash.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The district 
court granted the Union's motion.  The court found that because 
neither Exxon's policy nor the Coast Guard regulations mandate 
dismissal of an employee who refuses to submit to a reasonable 
cause test, Cash's reinstatement did not violate public policy. 
The court also found that the arbitrator acted within his 
authority in determining that cause did not exist to discharge 
Cash.  Exxon timely filed a Notice of Appeal. 
  We have jurisdiction over the district court's grant of 
summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is plenary, 
and we apply the same standard the district court should have 
applied in reviewing the arbitration award.  Stroehmann Bakeries, 
Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1440-
41 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 660 (1992). 
II.  
 In its argument that the trial court's order should be 
upheld, the Union emphasizes the favored treatment given 
arbitration awards in the courts.  The Supreme Court has 
frequently cautioned courts of the extremely limited role they 
play in reviewing the decision of an arbitrator.  See United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). 
It has said that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of 
an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under 
collective bargaining agreements.  The federal policy of settling 
labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had 
the final say on the merits of the awards."  United Steelworkers 
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).  Thus, 
we must enforce an arbitration award if it is based on an 
arguable interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, 
and we may only vacate an award if it is entirely unsupported by 
the record or if it reflects a "manifest disregard" of the 
agreement.  News America Publications, Inc. v. Newark 
Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
 On the other hand, under an exception to the general 
rule, a court may vacate an award if it violates a "well defined 
 and dominant" public policy, discerned "'by reference to the laws 
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interests.'"  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 
759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 
U.S. 49, 66 (1945)); United Trans. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban 
Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1995).  Application of 
the public policy exception requires a two step analysis.  The 
threshold question is whether a well defined and dominant public 
policy can be identified.  If so, the court must determine 
whether the arbitrator's award, as reflected in his or her 
interpretation of the agreement, violated the public policy. 
Exxon relies on the public policy exception on this appeal, 
contending that in this case both questions should be answered in 
the affirmative. 
A. 
 Exxon argues that the arbitrator's reinstatement of 
Cash following his refusal to submit to a drug test was contrary 
to the well defined public policy against the operation of common 
carriers by individuals impaired by drugs or alcohol.  This court 
has twice recognized such a policy in cases involving Exxon 
seamen.  Exxon now asks us to complete a "trilogy" by finding 
that reinstatement of an employee in a safety-sensitive position 
who refuses to submit to a chemical test violates that public 
policy.   
 We first identified a broad public policy against 
permitting an individual to operate a vessel while under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon 
 Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Exxon 
I], which arose after an Exxon oil tanker ran aground.  Helmsman 
Morris Foster was among the crew given a drug and alcohol test 
under Coast Guard regulations and Exxon's Alcohol and Drug Use 
Policy.  Exxon fired him on the basis of its drug policy when he 
tested positive for marijuana.  The arbitrators decided that 
suspension was a more appropriate penalty than discharge, noting 
that there was insufficient evidence indicating that Foster had 
used drugs at work and that Foster had passed the Coast Guard 
drug screening level, which was higher than Exxon's.  Id. at 359-
60.   
 The district court vacated the award, and we affirmed, 
finding that the award requiring reinstatement violated "a 'well-
defined and dominant' public policy against the operation of a 
vessel under the influence of drugs or alcohol" reflected in the 
Coast Guard regulation.  Id. at 362 (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. 
at 766).  We referred to one regulation requiring that 
individuals testing positive for drugs "shall be denied 
employment . . . or removed from duties which directly affect the 
safety of the vessel's navigation or operations," 46 C.F.R. 
§16.201(c) (1990), and another prohibiting those individuals from 
returning to work aboard a vessel unless rehabilitation is shown, 
id. § 16.370(d) (1990).  993 F.2d at 364.  We concluded that the 
purpose of the Coast Guard regulations would be undermined and 
their deterrence function undercut by the reinstatement of 
Foster.  Id. 
  We also noted that his reinstatement would be 
inconsistent with public policy as identified by other courts 
that had vacated arbitral awards reinstating operators of common 
carriers discharged for drug or alcohol use.  See, e.g., Delta 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 
(11th Cir. 1988) (vacating arbitration award reinstating a pilot 
who flew a passenger airplane while under the influence of 
alcohol), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 
122 (5th Cir. 1983)(vacating award reinstating tractor-trailer 
driver after he overturned company truck while intoxicated).   
 In holding that the arbitrators' award requiring 
reinstatement would violate public policy we declined to accept 
the union's argument that the public policy exception to 
enforcing an arbitrators' award could only be applied when the 
award contravened a rule of positive law.  We found the broader 
test adopted by most of the circuits to be "the sounder 
approach," 993 F.2d at 363, and noted that "the contours of 
positive law are broad enough to include not just specific rules 
or prohibitions but also the stated purposes behind the rules and 
prohibitions."  Id. at 364.  We thus held that the award 
reinstating Foster "violates the public policy protecting the 
public and the environment against operation of vessels by drug 
users."  Id. 
 We identified a similar public policy in Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir. 1993) 
[hereinafter Exxon II].  Seaman Randall Fris was observed in an 
 impaired condition when he reported back one evening to the Exxon 
Long Beach tanker.  He was discharged after a breathalyzer test 
disclosed a blood-alcohol level in violation of both the 
company's alcohol policy and Coast Guard regulations.  The 
arbitration panel found that Fris had been intoxicated when he 
boarded the ship but concluded, over the dissent of the company 
representative, that in light of Fris' good record he should have 
been given an opportunity to demonstrate that his intoxication 
was an aberration.  It thus reinstated Fris with a 90-day 
suspension.  Once again the district court vacated the award, and 
we affirmed. 
 We held in Exxon II that there is a well defined and 
dominant public policy "that an owner or operator of an oil 
tanker should not be compelled to reinstate to a `safety-
sensitive' position an individual who has been found to be 
intoxicated while on duty on that vessel."  Id. at 1194.  We 
noted that under Coast Guard regulations, a crew member who is 
intoxicated while on duty is guilty of a crime under 33 C.F.R. 
§95.055 (1993).  Marine employers are prohibited from allowing an 
intoxicated individual to "stand watch or perform other duties," 
id. § 95.050(b), and must exercise "due diligence" to see that 
the regulations concerning intoxication are not violated, id. 
§95.050(a).  11 F.3d at 1194-95.  We emphasized the potentially 
disastrous environmental consequences of an oil spill, and noted 
that statutes such as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et 
seq., and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et 
seq., evidence a Congressional policy of protecting the 
 environment against oil spills in waters under federal 
jurisdiction.  11 F.3d at 1194.  We also noted that Exxon faced 
potential civil and criminal liability if an impaired Exxon 
employee caused an accident.  Id. at 1195.  Consequently, we 
concluded that the federal policy favoring settlement of labor 
disputes by arbitration must yield to the "well defined and 
dominant policy that owners and operators of oil tankers should 
be permitted to discharge crew members who are found to be 
intoxicated while on duty."  Id. at 1196. 
 It is in light of our two previous Exxon cases that 
articulate a strong public policy against the operation of oil 
tankers and common carriers by crew members who are under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol that we turn to the somewhat 
different fact posture presented by this appeal. 
B.   
 Exxon argues that reinstatement of an employee who 
refuses to submit to a drug test upon a showing of reasonable 
cause violates the public policy identified in Exxon I and Exxon 
II because it undermines enforcement of the Coast Guard 
regulations and other laws animated by that policy.  Exxon does 
not argue that Cash's refusal to take a drug test under these 
circumstances violated any positive law.  In both Exxon I and 
Exxon II we acknowledged that another court of appeals had held 
that an arbitration award could be overturned only when its 
enforcement would cause a violation of positive law, see 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 808 F.2d 
76, 83-84 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988); 
 American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 
F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986), whereas others have opted for a 
broader approach that authorizes vacating an award that is 
"inconsistent with some significant public policy," E.I. DuPont 
de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 
611, 616 (7th Cir.)(quoting Robert A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor 
Law 597 (1976)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986); see also 
United States postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 
F.2d 822, 824 (1st Cir. 1984).  In United Paperworkers 
International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), the 
Supreme Court considered the breadth of the public policy 
exception but declined to resolve this split. 
 In favoring the broader approach in Exxon I, we stated 
that "the distinction between an award which violates a 
manifestation of positive law and an award which is `inconsistent 
with public policy' is often blurred."  993 F.2d at 363.  We 
reasoned that "[w]here the `positive law' is a stated purpose 
behind a statute or regulation, to thwart the purpose is to 
`violate positive law.'"  Id. at 364.  In Exxon II, we clarified 
that in the earlier case we had "expressly rejected" the argument 
that an arbitration award may only be set aside when its 
enforcement would violate a specific "positive law."  Exxon II, 
11 F.3d at 1192.  Accord United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. 
Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1995).   
 The Union, although acknowledging that we opted for a 
broader reading of the public policy exception in Exxon I and II, 
argues that notwithstanding our broad language in those cases we 
 cited to and relied on positive law.  It notes that whereas 
reinstatement of the particular employees at issue in Exxon I and 
II would have violated specific Coast Guard regulations or placed 
Exxon in jeopardy of facing civil and criminal liability, there 
is no regulation or statute that punishes the refusal of an 
employee to submit to a drug test that is based on "reasonable 
cause."  It differentiates the Coast Guard regulations that apply 
to post-accident testing, where the refusal to submit "could 
subject the individual to suspension and revocation proceedings . 
. . and removal from any duties which directly affect the safety 
of the vessel's navigation or operations," 46 C.F.R. § 4.06-5(c) 
(1994), from those applicable to an employee who refuses to 
submit to reasonable cause drug testing, which only require the 
employer to enter the seaman's refusal in the vessel's official 
logbook, if such a book is required, id. § 16.250(d).  Thus, the 
Union contends the regulations do not manifest a public policy 
that would prevent reinstatement of an employee who refuses to 
submit to a reasonable cause drug test.   
 The district court relied on this distinction to find 
that reinstatement of such an employee would not violate public 
policy.  Exxon argues that in fact the Coast Guard regulations do 
provide the possibility of a more stringent sanction for refusal 
to undergo reasonable cause testing, but in our view of the issue 
we need not resolve that dispute.  To the extent that the 
district court held that the parameters of public policy were 
limited by the extent to which the Coast Guard regulations impose 
a penalty, it misconstrued our holdings in Exxon I and II.  In 
 fact, in Exxon I, Foster's drug test was negative when evaluated 
at the Coast Guard screening level, and thus Coast Guard 
regulations did not require that his license be revoked.  993 
F.2d at 358, 361.  Nevertheless, we found that his reinstatement 
would violate the public policy underlying those regulations. Id. 
at 364.   
 A clearly defined and cautiously administered program 
of drug testing, whether based on random testing or reasonable 
cause, is the natural corollary to our earlier opinions 
identifying a strong public policy that precludes allowing 
intoxicated or drug-impaired seamen to remain in safety-sensitive 
positions aboard oil tankers.  We noted in Exxon II that "the 
statutes and regulations . . . convey the unequivocal message 
that . . . an owner or operator [of an oil tanker] should take 
every practicable step to ensure that an intoxicated crew member 
does not cause or contribute to an oil spill."  11 F.3d at 1195. 
The right to test employees for alcohol or drug use upon a 
showing of reasonable cause, on threat of discharge, is critical 
to achieving the objective of the Coast Guard regulations and of 
the environmental protection statutes we have cited.  Were 
employees permitted to refuse to submit to such chemical tests, 
it is difficult to imagine why any drug user would consent.   
 The federal government has manifested its strong 
support for drug testing of employees involved in mass 
transportation through the promulgation by all federal agencies 
governing mass transportation of regulations designed to prevent 
drug use by employees in safety-sensitive positions.  Such 
 regulations in most instances equate refusal to test with a 
"positive" test result.  See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. 
§121.455(c)(1995)(Federal Aviation Administration); 49 C.F.R. § 
§219.213, 219.505, 219.603(b) & (c) (1994)(Federal Railroad 
Administration); 49 C.F.R. § 391.95(d) (1994)(Federal Highway 
Administration); 49 C.F.R. § 653.35(a)(1994) (Federal Transit 
Administration); 10 C.F.R. § 26.27(c)(1994) (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission).   
 The force of our decisions in Exxon I and II would be 
radically undermined if we declined to take the logical next step 
and decide that reinstatement of an employee who refused to 
submit to a drug test upon a showing of reasonable cause violates 
public policy.  Although Coast Guard regulations do not mandate 
discharge for an employee - even one in a safety-sensitive 
position - who refuses a drug test, we conclude that if Exxon had 
cause to require a test, Cash's reinstatement following his 
refusal would violate public policy because it would undercut 
enforcement of Coast Guard regulations and environmental statutes 
which denote a well defined and dominant public policy against 
permitting intoxicated crew members to operate oil tankers and 
other common carriers.  Cf. Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 
1145 (7th Cir. 1982)(company rule forbidding employees from 
reporting health violations violated public policy because it 
hindered accomplishment of the goals of the Meat Inspection Act).  
      C. 
  Exxon recognized that under its collective bargaining 
agreement, the Union was entitled to grieve whether there was 
reasonable cause to require Cash to submit to a drug test.  The 
Chairman found that Exxon lacked "cause" to require Cash to 
submit to a drug test, but that Cash was "insubordinate" for 
refusing to take the test.  However, because discharge for 
insubordination was not mandated by the company policy, the 
Chairman determined that discharge was too harsh a sanction, and 
the panel ordered Cash reinstated without back pay.   
 In considering Exxon's challenge to the arbitral award, 
we do not review for legal error, but are limited to assessing 
whether the award "draw[s] its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement."  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 
U.S. 757, 766 (1983).  This standard is satisfied "'if the 
interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the 
agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context and 
any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where there is 
a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by 
principles of contract construction and the law of the shop, may 
a reviewing court disturb the award.'"  Super Tire Engineering 
Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 
1983) (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 
1128 (3d Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984).  See 
also News America Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 
918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)("A court may not overrule an 
arbitrator simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator's 
construction of the contract or because it believes its 
 interpretation of the contract is better than that of the 
arbitrator." (citation omitted)).  
 Exxon argues that we should set aside the award because 
the arbitrator exceeded his authority in reinstating Cash to his 
former position.  In reviewing Exxon's multi-faceted challenge to 
the arbitral decision we may not "second-guess[] the arbitrator's 
fact-finding, particularly insofar as the conclusion that the 
asserted public policy would be violated by the employee's 
reinstatement depends on drawing factual inferences not made by 
the arbitrator."  United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n 
of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 1.  The Cause Requirement 
 Exxon argues that in interpreting the company drug 
policy's requirement that "cause" support a drug test, the 
Chairman impermissibly inserted a "clear and convincing" evidence 
of ownership standard, and employed an "ex post" analysis to 
assess whether cause existed.  The Union responds that the 
quantum of proof required in such cases is unsettled, but that 
where the offense charged is one that is punishable by law, such 
as drug possession, arbitrators have commonly held employers to a 
"clear and convincing" or "beyond a reasonable doubt standard." 
Brief of Appellee at 35 (citing Frank Elkouri & Edna Asper 
Elkouri, How Arbitration Works  661-63 (4th ed. 1985)).  It 
further maintains that neither the parties' contract nor the 
company's Drug and Alcohol Policy defined "cause," identified a 
standard of proof to be employed, or specified at what point in 
 time "cause" must exist; therefore, these determinations were 
within the province of the arbitrator. 
 We agree.  The parties bargained for an arbitrator to 
interpret their contract.  The Exxon Drug and Alcohol Policy 
states: "[t]he Company . . . has the right to require employees 
to submit to medical evaluation or alcohol and drug testing where 
cause exists to suspect alcohol or drug misuse."  App. at 44 
(emphasis added).  The term "cause" is ambiguous.  Where a 
contractual ambiguity exists it is within the province of the 
arbitrator to interpret the ambiguous phrase.  Suburban Transit 
Corp., 51 F.3d at 380-81.  Although the Chairman's opinion may 
not be a model of clarity, it is evident that he ultimately 
concluded that Exxon lacked "cause" to require Cash to submit to 
a drug test.  That Exxon now disagrees with that conclusion is 
not a ground for vacating his decision.  Exxon could have defined 
"cause" more specifically in its policy, or could have bargained 
with the union to remove cases arising under its drug policy from 
the jurisdiction of arbitrators altogether.  It did not, and 
therefore may not now be heard to complain that the arbitrator 
lacked authority to make determinations that the company policy 
and the parties' agreement left open for an arbitrator's 
judgment. 
 2. Change of Discipline 
 Exxon next argues that the arbitrator lacked authority 
to reinstate Cash because the company's September 28, 1988 letter 
clearly notified employees that termination was the penalty for 
violation of the Drug and Alcohol Policy.  But the Drug Policy 
 requires only that employees submit to testing "where cause 
exists."  The arbitrator concluded that it did not; accordingly, 
based on his findings, the arbitrator did not exceed his 
authority. 
 Exxon further maintains that the arbitrator lacked 
authority to change the discipline for a finding of 
insubordination, and in doing so exceeded his power to interpret 
the contract.  The arbitrator found that Cash's refusal to take 
the drug test was insubordinate.  Although company rules permit 
Exxon to discharge an employee for insubordination, the 
arbitrator believed that under these circumstances a discharge 
would conflict with the requirement that "cause" support an order 
to take a drug test.   
 This situation is analogous to the one we faced in 
Super Tire, 721 F.2d 121.  In that case, drinking alcohol during 
work hours was characterized in the parties' contract as a cause 
for "immediate dismissal."  Id. at 122.  Yet dismissal also 
required "just cause."  Id.  The arbitrator determined that 
although the employee had been drinking during work hours, 
dismissal was too harsh a punishment because the employee had not 
been warned that the company would strictly enforce its policy. 
We reversed the district court's order vacating the arbitrator's 
determination because we concluded that the terms of the contract 
were not so clear as to foreclose the arbitrator's interpretation 
that a warning was required.  Id. at 125.  
 In Super Tire, we relied on our earlier decision in 
Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752 (3d. Cir.), cert. 
 denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).  There, a clause in the employment 
contract provided for discharge of employees absent from work for 
four consecutive days without good cause.  Another section 
provided that employees shall be discharged only for "just 
cause."  Id. at 753.  The arbitrator reinstated an employee who 
had been terminated for being absent from work for 19 days 
without good cause.  The district court vacated the award.  We 
held that the district court erred because "[i]t cannot be said 
with absolute certainty . . . that discharge under this section 
is `strictly a function of management.'"  Id. at 756 (quoting 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 584 (1960)). 
 Similarly here, the Agreement stated that 
insubordination "shall constitute cause for which unlicensed 
personnel may be discharged."  App. at 147 (emphasis added).  The 
subsequent September 1988 letter warned that the company's Drug 
and Alcohol Policy would be strictly enforced.  The policy 
included the provision that employees must submit to drug testing 
"where cause exists."  App. at 44.  The Chairman found that 
reading these provisions together, the "just cause" standard 
still applied, and because Exxon lacked cause to test Cash, 
discharge for insubordination would be inappropriate.  As in 
Super Tire and Arco, we cannot say that the arbitrator's reading 
of the contract is implausible and that his decision to reinstate 
Cash was beyond the bounds of his authority.        
  3. Interpretation of Coast Guard Regulations  
  Exxon also contends that the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by interpreting Coast Guard regulations, because an 
arbitrator's decision must be based exclusively on the collective 
bargaining agreement.  In light of the fact that the Chairman 
based his decision on the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement, even though he referred to the Coast Guard 
regulations, see App. at 93, we have no occasion to consider 
whether, as Exxon claims, the Chairman interpreted the 
regulations incorrectly. 
 4.  Reasonableness of Arbitrator's Findings 
 Finally, we consider whether the Chairman's finding in 
this case that Exxon lacked "cause" to order Cash to take a drug 
test was so unreasonable that it would violate public policy to 
enforce his award.  The Chairman found that there was marijuana 
or marijuana residue in numerous places in the cabin Cash was 
using.  Specifically, there was green leafy material in a desk 
and cabinet, ash on the rug, seeds under the rug, and two butts 
of marijuana, referred to as "roaches," in a suitcase pouch.  The 
Union emphasized Cash's minimal association with that room, in 
that Cash had been assigned there less than two days before and 
had spent only a few hours there because he was working long 
shifts elsewhere on the ship.  
 At oral argument, Exxon argued that where, as here, a 
matter of public policy is involved, the arbitrator's findings 
should be held to a higher standard of scrutiny and set aside if 
unreasonable.  We find no authority for vacating an arbitral 
award on such grounds.  On the contrary, an arbitrator's decision 
 need be neither wise nor internally consistent.  In fact, 
arbitrators have no obligation to explain their reasons for an 
award or even to write an opinion unless the contract so 
requires.  Virgin Islands Nursing Association's Bargaining Unit 
v. Schneider, 668 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1981); see also United 
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 
(1960).  Arbitrators' decisions are subject to a standard of only 
"minimal rationality."  Virgin Islands Nursing, 668 F.2d at 223 
(quoting Robert A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 586 (1976)). 
Although we will vacate an award if we find that the award itself 
violates public policy, the public policy exception does not 
lessen our deference to an arbitrator's factual findings.   
   The Supreme Court has made clear that findings of fact 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom are the exclusive province 
of the arbitrator.  United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 44 (1987).  That a court "is inquiring 
into a possible violation of public policy [does not] excuse a 
court for doing the arbitrator's task."  Id. at 45.  Thus, this 
court may not refuse enforcement even if we consider the evidence 
sufficient to prove that reasonable cause existed to require Cash 
to submit to a drug test.  Exxon challenges the reasonableness of 
the arbitrator's conclusions, but "[n]o dishonesty is alleged; 
only improvident, even silly, factfinding is claimed." Id. at 39. 
 It is not our role to draw inferences that the 
factfinder did not.  We therefore will not disturb the 
arbitrator's finding that "cause" did not exist to require Cash 
to submit to a drug test.  Accordingly, because we accept the 
 arbitrator's finding that Cash was ordered to submit to a test 
without reasonable cause, his reinstatement does not offend 
public policy and the decision of the arbitrator must be 
enforced. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
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  Hon. Marjorie O. Rendell, United States District Judge for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
